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Abstract—In this paper the secure performance for the visible
light communication (VLC) system with multiple eavesdroppers
is studied. By considering the practical amplitude constraint
instead of an average power constraint in the VLC system, the
closed-form expressions for the upper and the lower bounds of
the secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy capacity
are derived. Since the locations for both legitimate receiver and
eavesdroppers are unknown as well as random, the stochastic ge-
ometry method is introduced for problem formulation. Moreover,
accurate expressions with a low computational complexity are
obtained with the rigorous derivation. Simulation results verify
the correctness of our theoretical analysis.
Index Terms—Visible light communication, amplitude con-
straint, secrecy outage probability, average secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
V ISIBLE light communication (VLC) has received in-creasing attentions due to the abundant license-free
spectrum resources and the effective reuse of frequency and
space. It is a promising technology to tackle the spectrum
scarcity [1], [2] and to support the fifth generation and beyond
wireless communication systems [3]. Moreover, different from
the traditional radio frequency (RF) channel, VLC is mainly
implemented by light-of-sight (LoS) as visible light is blocked
by the opaque materials, which is beneficial for secure trans-
missions. Nevertheless, VLC faces the risk of eavesdropping
due to the broadcast nature [4], [5]. To address this issue,
two main schemes can be introduced. One hand, upper-layer
encryption [4] is a common secure scheme, but it is often
challenged by high computational power and cloud computing.
On the other hand, physical layer security (PLS), as a new
and effective secure scheme, can achieve information secure
transmission based on the randomness of channels [6], [7].
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Although many existing works have analyzed the secure
performance of PLS techniques in the traditional RF based
wireless communication systems, these analyses cannot be di-
rectly applied to the VLC systems since the VLC channels are
subject to the amplitude constraint [2], [6]. As such, generally
speaking it is difficult to obtain an analytical expression for
the VLC channel capacity [8]. Fortunately, there have been
several closed-form expressions derived the upper and the
lower bounds for the channel capacity with the amplitude
constraint in the VLC systems [6], [8] and [9].
Based on the lower bound of the channel capacity derived in
[9], the authors in [10] investigated the PLS in a 3-D multiuser
VLC systems with and without the access points (AP) cooper-
ation. Meanwhile, in order to enhance the security, a scheme
that builds a disk-shaped secrecy protection zone around the
AP was proposed. Moreover, in [8], the analytically tractable
expressions for the lower and the upper channel capacities
were derived, and the achievable secrecy rates of multiple-
input-single-output (MISO) VLC systems were analyzed. A
robust beamforming scheme for maximizing the worst-case
secrecy rate was proposed. Furthermore, in order to maximize
the secrecy rate or minimize the total power consumption,
the optimal and robust secure beamforming schemes were
proposed in MISO VLC systems under both perfect and
imperfect channel state information (CSI) of eavesdropper [6].
Note that the secure analysis and robust beamforming in [6]
and [8] were established in the case that the CSI or the loca-
tions of the eavesdroppers are known. However, the locations
of the eavesdroppers are usually unknown in practice [11]. In
this case, the authors have analyzed the secure performance
and proposed a new MISO beamforming scheme based on the
eavesdropper intensity. Moreover, the closed-form expressions
for the bound of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) were
derived under the light emitting diode (LED) selection scheme.
Furthermore, by ignoring the peak power constraint, the gen-
eralized closed-form expressions of the SOP and the average
secrecy capacity (ASC) were derived in the VLC system with
multiple random distributed eavesdroppers [5].
Instead of considering the over-simplified signal model in
[5], the secure performance is analyzed in the case that multi-
ple eavesdroppers are randomly distributed in the VLC system
with a practical amplitude constraint. The main contributions
are summarized as follows.
1) The closed-form expressions for the upper and the lower
bounds of the SOP and the ASC are derived by using the
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Fig. 1: The VLC system model.
stochastic geometry method and the derivation is very different
from that in [5]. Moreover, it provides meaningful insight and
guidance for the practical design of the VLC system with a
amplitude constraint.
2) Accurate expressions with a low computational complex-
ity for the SOP and the ASC are obtained and our derivations
are more rigorous than that in [5]. Moreover, simulation results
verify our theoretical analysis and show that the gap of the
bounds on SOP is tighter than that in [11].
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. The system
model and the preliminaries are presented in Section II.
Section III analyzes the upper and the lower bounds of the SOP
and the ASC. In Section IV, simulation results are presented.
Finally, this letter is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, to facilitate the analysis, the system model
is presented, and some preliminaries are clarified and derived.
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, the downlink VLC system within a
circular area of radius R is considered. Similar to [5], L
LEDs are deployed in the center of the ceiling and closed
to each other. Moreover, the LEDs provide illumination and
communication services.Furthermore, the transmitted signal x
satisfies an amplitude constraint to avoid clipping distortion
due to the limited dynamic range of the LED [8]. Thus, the
amplitude constraint is given as
|x| ≤ A. (1)
Meanwhile, K passive eavesdroppers exist in the VLC
system and they can eavesdrop the confidential information.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the legitimate
receiver location is modeled as a uniform distribution and
those eavesdroppers are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson
Point Process (HPPP) with an intensity λ [5], [10].
According to [5] and [8], the LoS path dominates the
propagation and all the non-LoS paths can be neglected. Thus,
the ith VLC channel gain is given as
hi =
(mt,i + 1)AR,i cosϕi
2πdi
2 cos
m
t,i(θi)g(ϕi)Ts(ϕi), (2)
where AR,i and di are the detection area and the distance
between the ith LED and the receiver, respectively. ϕi and
θi indicate the incident angle and the radiation angle shown
in Fig. 1, respectively. mt,i = −log(2)/log(cosθ1/2,i) denotes
the order of Lambertian radiant with the ith LED semi-angle
θ1/2,i. Ts(ϕi) is the optical filter gain. g(ϕi)=n
2/sin2(ΨFoV,i)
denotes the optical concentrator (OC) gain, which depends on
the refractive index ni of the OC and the field of view ΨFoV,i
of the photodiode. Note that hi = 0 when ϕi>ΨFoV,i.
B. Preliminaries
In order to utilize the statistical information of all receiver
locations effectively, according to the work in [5], the rela-
tionship between the distance di,k and the received RF power
Pi,k from the ith LED to the kth receiver can be given as
Pi,k = A
2(Ci,k,RF /d
4
k)G
2
t,iG
2
r,i, (3)
where Ci,k,RF is the RF power constant [5]. G
2
t,i =
cosmt,i,k(θi,k) and G
2
r,i = cos
mr,i,k(ϕi,k) are the radiation gain
of the LED and the incidence gain of the receiver, respectively.
Moreover, mt,i,k= mt,i and mr,i,k=−log(2)/log(cosΨi,k).
It is assumed that all receivers (legitimate receiver and
eavesdroppers) try to obtain the best performance for their own
perspective. Thus, all photodiodes always face the radiation
line [5]. Based on the geometric relationship illustrated in Fig.
1, the received RF power in eq. (3) can be rewritten as
Pi,k = A
2Ci,k,RFH
2mt(H2 + r2i,k)
−2−mi,t . (4)
For the VLC channels with the amplitude constraint and
similar to the simplification process in [5], the peak signal-to-
noise-ratio (SNR) for all receivers can be given as
γi,k = LCi,k(H
2 + r2i,k)
−2−mt,i , (5)
where Ci,k=A
2Ci,k,RFH
2mi,t/N0, and N0 is the noise power.
Due to the amplitude constraint in eq. (1), the upper and
the lower instantaneous secrecy capacity bounds of the VLC
channel can be respectively given by [8].
Cuppers = max
{
1
2
log
(
γ0 + 1
γmaxE + 1
)
, 0
}
, (6a)
Clowers = max
{
1
2
log
(
6γ0 + 3πe
πeγmaxE + 3πe
)
, 0
}
, (6b)
where γmaxE = max
1≤k≤K
{γk} denotes the highest SNR among all
eavesdroppers and γ0 is the SNR of the legitimate receiver.
For the HPPP model, one has P (Φ= k) = [µkexp(−µ)]/k!,
where k=0,. . .,K represents the kth eavesdropper;Φ denotes
the number of eavesdropper, and µ=λπR2 is the mean of the
HPPP. The probability density function (PDF) of the horizontal
distance between the eavesdropper and the LED can be given
as fr = λ/µ = 1/(πR
2), which is the same as the PDF of
the legitimate receiver. Thus, the PDF of all receivers can be
summarized as fr. By using the stochastic geometry theory,
the PDF and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γk
are respectively given by [5].
fγk(x) = ax
b, (7a)
Fγk(x) = ax
c/c+ ǫ, (7b)
where ǫ = H2/D2 + 1, a = −c/(R2Cc), b = c − 1, and
c = −1/(mt+2). The variable x ∈ [γmin,γmax], and γmin =
3C(H2+R2)−(mt+2), γmax = CH
−2(mt+2). Note that C
∆
= Ck.
By using the probability theory and the independent variables
γ1, . . . , γK , one has Fγmax
E
(x)=
∏K
i=1Fγk(x). Thus, the PDF
of γmaxE is given as
fγmax
E
(x)=aK
K−1∑
i=0
Q
(a
c
)i
xci+c−1ǫK−1−i=aK
K−1∑
i=0
αix
βi , (8)
whereQ=
(
K−1
i
)
. Moreover, to simplify the expression, αi and
βi are used to replace Q(
a
c)
i
ǫK−1−i and ci+c−1, respectively.
III. SOP AND ASC ANALYSIS
In this section, due to the similarity between the eq. (6a)
and (6b), a general forms for the upper and the lower bounds
of the SOP and the ASC are analyzed.
A. Upper and Lower Bounds of SOP
Based on eq. (6), the upper and the lower bounds of the
SOP can be respectively given as
PupperSOP =P(γ0≤σuγ
max
E +ζu)=
∫ ymax
ymin
∫ xmax
xmin
fγ0(x)fγmaxE (y)dxdy,
(9a)
PlowerSOP =P(γ0≤σlγ
max
E +ζl)=
∫ ymax
ymin
∫ xmax
xmin
fγ0(x)fγmaxE (y)dxdy,
(9b)
where σu =
pie22Cth
6 , σl = 2
2Cth and ζu = 3σu − πe/2,
ζl = σl − 1. In the following analysis, the subscript u and l
represent the upper and lower bound analysis, respectively.
Note that the integral interval should be discussed due to the
uncertainty between γmax and σy+ζ. Table I summarizes all
the integral intervals, where γlimit =
γmax−ζ
σ . It can be seen
TABLE I: The integral interval of (9)
Case xmin xmax ymin ymax
1
σy + ζ < γmax
(γmax − ζ)/σ > γmin
γmin σy + ζ γmin γlimit
2
σy + ζ < γmax
(γmax − ζ)/σ < γmin
γmin σy + ζ Empty set
3
σy + ζ > γmax
(γmax − ζ)/σ > γmin
γmin γmax γlimit γmax
4
σy + ζ > γmax
γmax − ζ/σ < γmin
γmin γmax γmin γmax
that cases 1, 3, and 4 need to be analyzed. The upper and the
lower bounds of the SOP in case 1 can be given as
PSOP1(σ, ζ) =
∫ γlimit
γmin
∫ σy+ζ
γmin
fγ0(x)fγmaxE (y)dxdy
=σb+1Θ
K−1∑
i=0
αi
∫ γlimit
γmin
yβi
(
y+
ζ
σ
)b+1
dy−γb+1minΘ
K−1∑
i=0
αi
∫ γlimit
γmin
yβidy
=−γb+1minΘ
K−1∑
i=0
αi
(
γβi+1limit
βi + 1
−
γβi+1min
βi + 1
)
+ σb+1Θ
K−1∑
i=0
αi
×
[
δb+1γlimit
βi+1H
(
[−b− 1, βi + 1], βi + 2,−
γlimit
δ
)
βi + 1
−
δb+1γmin
βi+1H
(
[−b− 1, βi + 1], βi + 2,−
γmin
δ
)
βi + 1
]
, (10)
where δ= ζσ , Θ=
a2K
b+1 and H(·) is the hygergeom function.
Since the unique difference between case 3 and 4 is the
integral interval of the variable y, in order to simplify this
derivation process, the upper and the lower bounds of the SOP
in case 3 and 4 are derived together as
PSOP3,4(σ, ζ) =
∫ γmax
ymin
∫ γmax
γmin
fγ0(x)fγmaxE (y)dxdy
= a2K
K−1∑
i=0
αi
∫ γmax
ymin
yβi
∫ γmax
γmin
xbdxdy
= Θ
K−1∑
i=0
αi
(
γb+1max − γ
b+1
min
) γβi+1max − yβi+1min
βi + 1
, (11)
where ymin is case dependent (case 3 or 4).
Thus, the upper and the lower bounds of the SOP can be
respectively summarized as
P upperSOP = PSOP1(σu, ζu) + PSOP3,4(σu, ζu), (12a)
P lowerSOP = PSOP1(σl, ζl) + PSOP3,4(σl, ζl). (12b)
B. Upper and Lower Bounds of ASC
The ASC is the expected value of the instantaneous secrecy
capacity Cs. The upper and the lower bounds of the ASC can
be summarized as
C
u,l
s =
∫ γmax
γmin
∫ γmax
γmin
Cu,ls f(γ0, γ
max
E )dγ0dγ
max
E
=
1
2 ln 2
[ ∫ γmax
γmin
ln(m0x+ n0)fγ0(x)
∫ x
γmin
fγmax
E
(y)dydx︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
u,l
s1
−
∫ γmax
γmin
ln(mEy + nE)fγmax
E
(y)
∫ γmax
y
fγ0(x)dxdy︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
u,l
s2
]
, (13)
where f(γ0,γ
max
E ) denotes the joint PDF of the legitimate
receiver and eavesdroppers. Moreover, all channels are in-
dependent. The upper bound of the ASC is obtained when
Cu,ls =C
upper
s , m0=1, n0=1, mE=1, and nE=1. The lower
bound of the ASC is obtained when Cu,ls = C
lower
s , m0 = 6,
n0 =3πe, mE = πe, and nE =3πe. In order to simplify the
analysis, a function is defined as
LP(τ,p,q)=
∫ q
p
xτ ln(1+x)dx =
qτ+1ln(q+1)
τ + 1
−
pτ+1ln(p+1)
τ + 1
+
qτ [τ2(1 − q) + τ(3 − 2q) + 2]
τ(τ + 2)(τ + 1)2
+
qτ (−2− τ)Φ(−q, 1, τ)
(τ + 1)(τ + 2)
−
pτ[τ2(1− p)+ τ(3−2p) +2]
τ(τ + 2)(τ + 1)2
−
pτ (−2− τ)Φ(−p,1,τ)
(τ + 1)(τ + 2)
, (14)
where Φ(·) is the LerchPhi function [12] and can be calculated
by Maple software.
4Subsequently C
u,l
s1 and C
u,l
s2 can be given as
C
u,l
s1 =
∫ γmax
mEγmin
m0
axb ln(m0x+n0)
∫ m0x
mE
γmin
aK
K−1∑
i=0
αiy
βidydx
= ∆1
[
ln(n0)
((γκimax−mEγminm0 κi)
κi(m0/mE)−(β+1)
−
γβi+1min (γ
b+1
max −
mEγmin
m0
b+1)
b + 1
)
+ (
m0
mE
)β+1(
n0
m0
)βi+b+2LP(κi − 1,
mEγmin
n0
,
m0γmax
n0
)
− γβi+1min (
n0
m0
)b+1LP(b,
mEγmin
n0
,
m0γmax
n0
)
]
, (15a)
C
u,l
s2 =
∫ m0γmax
mE
γmin
aK ln(mEy+nE)
K−1∑
i=0
αiy
βi
∫ γmax
mEy
m0
axbdxdy
= ∆2
[
ln(nE)
(γb+1max(m0γmaxmE βi+1−γβi+1min )
βi + 1
−
(m0γmaxmE
κi −γκimin)
κi(mE/m0)−(b+1)
)
− (
mE
m0
)(b+1)(
nE
mE
)κiLP(κi − 1,
mE
nE
γmin,
m0
nE
γmax)
+ γb+1max(
nE
mE
)βi+1LP(βi,
mE
nE
γmin,
m0
nE
γmax)
]
, (15b)
where ∆1=
∑K−1
i=0
a2Kαi
βi+1
, ∆2=
∑K−1
i=0
a2Kαi
b+1 , κi=βi+b+ 2.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results based on the Monte Carlo
are presented to demonstrate the correctness of the theoretical
analysis on the SOP and the ASC. The parameters are selected
based on the work in [5], given as: L = 4, θ1/2=70
◦, H=2.5
m, Cth=1 bit/s/Hz, N0=−98.82 dBm, and A=6 V.
It can be seen from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 that the simulation
results of the upper and the lower bounds of the SOP and the
ASC match well with the theoretical results, which verify the
accuracy of our theoretical analysis. For the SOP performance,
the gap between the upper and the lower bounds is tight.
Moreover, the SOP performance deteriorates with the increase
of the number of eavesdroppers that result from the increase
of either λ, or R, or both. For the ASC performance, it can be
seen from Fig. 3 that the ASC deteriorates with the increase
of λ or R, since the probability of eavesdroppers being closer
to the LEDs is gradually higher than that of the legitimate
receiver being closer to the LEDs. Moreover, the constraint
that K ≥ 1 in [5] is relaxed to obtain a reasonable setting
since the probability that the number of the eavesdroppers
equals to zero is dominant in the case of small intensity λ
with the HPPP model. Meantime, the ASC performance has
improved significantly.
V. CONCLUSION
The security performance analysis for the VLC system with
random location of eavesdroppers under the practical ampli-
tude constraint was studied. For the case that the locations
of the legitimate receiver and eavesdroppers are unknown, the
closed-form expressions for the upper and the lower bounds
of the SOP and the ASC were derived by using the stochastic
geometry method. Simulation results verified the correctness
of the theoretical analysis. Moreover, the analysis method
proposed in this paper can be easily extended into the case
with the collaborative multiple eavesdroppers.
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